Many anthropological questions tu rn on the assum ption th at hunter-gatherers w ork prim arily to m eet family needs. This assum ption is used to contrast hum ans and other prim ates (Lancaster and Lancaster 19 83), to de velop hypotheses about the design of our cognitive and social propensities (Tooby and DeVore 1987, Cosmides and Tooby 1992) , to construct scenarios of hom inid evo lution throughout the P lio/Pleistocene (Isaac 1978, Lea key and Lewin T992), and to guide inquiry into the ori gins of agriculture (Cohen 19 7 7 ). A nthropologists adopting m any theoretical perspectives (e.g., Harris 1989, Sahlins 1972, Sm ith 19 8 3) assum e th at foragers w ork to feed them selves and th eir fam ilies and th at m arked paternal investm ent is the key to a wide array of distinctive hum an patterns (W ashburn and Lancaster 1968, Lovejoy 19 8 1, Alexander 1990). I argue here th at goals th at com pete w ith fam ily provisioning shape the foraging strategies of contem porary people w ho depend directly on w ild foods. Since these goals arise from op portunities and constraints im posed on subsistence for agers by the characteristics of wild resources, they would have played an im portant role in the ancestral past.
For some categories of foods, notably m edium -sized and large game, there is little if any relationship betw een the am ounts foragers acquire them selves and the am ounts they and their fam ilies consum e. This raises two questions. First, w hy don't they keep w hat they ac quire? The proposition th at foragers share to reduce the risks posed by exploiting unpredictable resources is widely favored bu t lacks em pirical support. This gives the second question m ore force: W hy do foragers ever target resources th a t w ill go m ostly to others rather than to their spouses and children?
Widely shared resources are like public goods: they can be consum ed by those w ho do no t pay the acquisi tion costs. Econom ists have long noted th at self interested individuals w ill rarely contribute their fair share of the cost of any public good voluntarily (Samuelson 1954) . This is the problem so influentially ex posed by H ardin (1968) as "th e tragedy of the com m ons." It is the logic of collective action (Olson 1965) . A public good w ill be undersupplied by self-interested actors w ithout som e incentive distinct from the con sum ption value of the good itself.
If, as is argued below, unpredictably acquired largepackage foods are public goods, th en the supply of these foods poses a collective action problem at least as old as hunting or com petitively scavenging large anim als. Archaeological and ethnographic evidence shows th at such goods have long been supplied in hum an foraging com m unities. An inquiry into the incentives for provid ing them should contribute to an understanding of other social patterns in both the present and the past.
I elaborate the hypothesis th a t the incentive for pro viding widely shared goods is favorable attention from other group m em bers. If those w ho provide public goods are listened to and w atched m ore closely than others and favored as neighbors and associates, they have a larger, readier pool of potential allies and m ates. W hen this is so, foragers face a trade-off betw een increasing their fam ilies' food consum ption and increasing the attention they get from other m em bers of their group. Public goods w ill be provided when, for som e individuals, the fitness value of the latter outweighs th at of the former. This solution to the public-goods problem relies on iden tifying a fitness benefit th at depends directly on the con sum ption value of th e public good but is distinct from it.
An obvious gender difference is consistent w ith this argum ent. U nder some circum stances foraging m en may gain more fitness, as m easured (say) in grandchildren, by seeking social attention because of the support and m ating advantages they can use it to elicit. W omen may more often leave greater num bers of grandchildren by foregoing this social atten tio n and foraging for family consum ption instead. From this perspective hunting or com petitively scavenging large anim als is m ore often done by m en because they m ore often gain from pursu ing goals alternative to family provisioning.
After a brief discussion of evolutionary ecology, w hich focuses attention on fitness-related costs and benefits to individuals and consequently on the conflicts of interest that arise among m em bers of any social group, I review ethnographic data showing th a t foragers do not m ax imize the benefits they and their families receive in food consum ption by targeting widely shared foods. The pat tern is a challenge to long-standing views about nuclear families as basic un its of production in hum an societies and to the associated notion th at m en h u n t to feed their offspring. The data show wide and predictable variation in sharing of the resources th at foragers exploit. Simpli fying this variation in term s of tw o polar resource types ("private" vs. "collective" goods) and modeling the logic of collective action shows th at foragers w ill usually m axim ize their own family consum ption by targeting private goods. O ther benefits-aside from consum ption of the goods them selves-w ill be necessary to induce self-interested foragers to supply collective goods. A sec ond m odel indicates how such "selective incentives" (Olson 1965) give th at result. Taken together the models show th at if foragers seek consum ption benefits, they will target private goods; if they seek social benefits, they will target collective goods. By exploring how the values of these different kinds of benefits vary w ith for agers' age and sex and w ith local resource opportunities, we may explain variation in the kinds and am ounts of work foragers do. The supply of other collective goods may depend on sim ilar trade-offs.
Optimality
Evolutionary ecology poses problem s in economic term s (Maynard Sm ith 1978, Parker and Maynard Sm ith 1990).
Investigators cast questions about all aspects of individ ual organism s-developm ental, morphological, physio logical, behavioral-as allocation "decisions." In a world of lim ited tim e and m aterials, m ore of one thing means less of som ething else. N atural selection w ar rants the assum ption th at organisms are designed to m ake allocation decisions th a t generally serve their own fitness. Every allocation has a cost, the m issed benefits of alternatives foregone. Paradoxically, perfect alloca tions are unlikely because the benefits of im provem ents m ay not outweigh their costs, hence the optim izer's epi gram: "N othing w orth doing is w orth doing perfectly." Alternatives th at generally give higher n et fitness bene fits are nonetheless expected to predom inate. This justi fies the proposition th at hum an evolution has shaped people to assess and then adjust to a wide array of cir cum stances according to cues th at have been generally associated w ith their own fitness. No expectation that behavioral differences are due to genetic differences is required. Selection can result in tendencies to m ake fit ness-enhancing adjustm ents to circum stances th at pro duce wide phenotypic differences in a genetically hom o geneous population. These assum ptions provide the basis for asking questions about any aspect of hum an behavior (Smith and W interhalder 1992) , including ques tions about the am ount or kind of work people learn to do.
Since there is always the opportunity cost of gains foregone from alternative activities, the optim al am ount and kind of w ork w ill change w ith the array of possibili ties. Trade-offs w ill differ w ith circum stances. Any work decision m ay involve m any trade-offs, n o t only activi ties foregone bu t the profitability of different kinds of work, differences in the efficiency of "tim e-sharing" var ious other activities w ith different kinds of work, differ ences in payoffs if different kinds of w ork can be more efficiently done in different places or at different times, differences in the values of the products acquired, differ ences in the control workers have over the product, and differences in the way the products of work affect the behavior of others. The im portant question is w hether there are a few (ideally measurable) costs and benefits that capture enough of the fitness trade-offs to account for a significant part of the variation (both synchronic and diachronic) th at we hope to explain.
The cost of foraging is the benefits m issed from alter native activities. The cost of choosing a resource is the gain foregone from others not sought instead. Widely used optim al foraging m odels (Stephens and Krebs 1986, Smith 1983, Kaplan and Hill r 992) focus on the trade-off between the m ean acquisition rate (often m easured as expected calories per u n it time) gained from stopping to handle one resource and the expected rate from co n tin u ing to search for som ething better or betw een the mean acquisition rate gained from continuing to exploit one resource patch and the expected rate from traveling to and searching another. A lternatives are usually evalu ated along one dim ension of variation: the m ean n u tri tional acquisition rates expected from particular re sources or resource patches. The usual justification for focusing on acquisition rates is th at they are correlated w ith foragers' consum ption. For hum an foragers this hides a wide range of variation. Resources vary greatly in how m uch acquirers can expect to keep for their own or their fam ilies' consum ption (Kaplan 1983 , Kaplan and H ill 1985a) . For som e resources, foragers' acquisition rates are closely related to th e ir ow n or th eir fam ilies' consum ption rates; for others, they are not. If foragers m axim ize fam ily co n sum ption and expect to keep differ en t fractions of different resources, th en the am ounts they are likely to keep, n o t th e am ounts appropriated by others, should govern th eir choice of resources.
The Difference between Acquisition and Consumption D ata from three ethnographic cases show th a t som e re sources are so w idely shared th a t th e consum ption pay off a forager can expect from acquiring th em is low er th an if he had tak en others instead.
T he !Kung of n o rth w estern Botsw ana and adjacent parts of N am ibia are th e best-know n hunter-gatherers in th e w orld (Lee and DeVore 19 76 ). T hough th e effects of colonial histo ry in th is area have recently been h otly debated (Solway and Lee 1990, W ilm sen and D enbow 1990), in th e 1960s, w hen key qu an titativ e observations w ere undertaken, m o st depended on foraging for their daily subsistence (Lee 19 79 ). T hey took a diverse array of plan t and anim al resources, notably m ongongo nuts but also various tubers, berries, baobab, tsin beans, and m am m als ranging in size from sm all spring hares to giraffes. W om en cu stom arily exploited th e plant foods. M arshall's (1956) film and Lee's descriptions have pro vided a lasting im age of m en stalking big gam e w ith sm all bows and poisoned arrows, b u t m en also set snares for sm aller prey and collected p lan t foods. Lee em pha sized th e sharing in !Kung cam ps b u t noted th a t vegeta ble foods tended to stay at th e fire of th e collector and, by contrast, cited L om a M arshall's report th a t large ani m als w ere treated differently. W hereas sm all anim als and plan t foods w ere shared only w ith one's "im m ediate fam ily or w ith others as h e or she chooses," large an i m als w ere shared by all (M arshall 19 76 :357).
D uring a four-w eek period of the dry season in 1964, m ost of th e gam e tak en w as sm all anim als captured w ith snares. T he only large prey w ere four w arthogs, all killed by one h u n te r " w ith his excellent dogs" (p. 265). T hese represented 7 5 % of th e gam e by w eight during th e observation period. T he h u n te r responsible spent 16 days h u n tin g for estim ated earnings of 28,200 C al/day (p. 268).2 Six o th er m en w ho h u n ted killed only sm all 2. This is a notably high rate. Lee elsewhere 11979:242) estimates that hunters average two or three large animals a year and then says that even this m ay be "on the high side" (p. 243], citing Wilmsen's estimate of 0.6 large animal per man per year at /Xai/xai. If the 1 1 men monitored during Lee's period of observation had acquired his estimated 2.5 large animals per year each, the long-term average for the camp would have been 2.3/month. Counting only the 7 men who did any hunting during that period, the expected rate for the camp would still have been 1.4/month. Just one such catch could have more than doubled the meat consumed during July 1964. The failure of any hunter to kill a large antelope with poi soned arrows that month as well as ^T om a's remarkable success with his dogs indicate the huge short-term variation characteristic of big-game hunting (noted by Lee 1979:243).
anim als, earning an average of 2,719 C al/day each. M en provided 19 % of th e vegetable food during th is period, earning 12,000 C al/d ay of gathering (p. 262). C om bined w ith th e observations on sharing patterns, these data show the fam ily consum ption rates th a t foragers can ex pect from different resources. If the m eat of large an i m als w ere shared by all in a camp, the big-game h u n ter's consum ption fraction w ould vary w ith th e num b er of cam p residents. Lee reported 25 adult residents in th e camp he m onitored, including 1 1 m en. If each of these m en represented a fam ily, a h u n te r w ho acquired 28, 200 C al/day from large anim als m ig h t have expected to keep 1 / 1 1 for his fam ily's share, 2,564 C al/day. By setting snares and targeting sm all gam e to keep at his ow n h earth h e w ould have done slightly better, 2,719 C al/ day, and by collecting p lan t foods instead h e w ould have done m u ch better, 12,000 C al/day. Even counting th e heavy processing required by som e p lan t resources (Hawkes and O 'C onnell 19 8 1, 19 85) retu rn s w ould still have been high: one to tw o days spent processing w ould still have m ean t 4,000-6,000 C al/d ay for gathered foods, nearly tw ice the am o u n t of consum ption earned from hunting. U nder these circum stances, a m an w ho chose to h u n t large anim als contributed m ore to others (in this case an order of m agnitude m ore th a n he kept, 25, 640 Cal/day) and less to h im s e lf a n d h is ow n fa m ily th an w hen he gathered or h u n ted and snared sm all game.
T he Ache of eastern Paraguay (Hill 19 8 3 ) in h ab it th e w ell-w atered forest ju st so u th of th e A m azon basin. D uring th e 1970s all began to spend at least part of th eir tim e in agricultural settlem en ts (Hawkes et al. 19 87) , devoting substantial am o u n ts of tim e to foraging trips away from th ese bases through th e early 1980s. P artici pation in a sam ple of these foraging trips has allow ed us to accum ulate a q u an titativ e record of foraging strate gies, tim e allocation, and food sharing (Hawkes, Hill, and O 'C onnell 19 82,-H ill and H aw kes 19 83; H ill et al. 1984 Kaplan et al. 1984; H urtado et al. 1985 ; Kaplan and H ill 19 85a) . Ache foragers exploit th e starch, fruit, and "h e a rt" of a palm ubiquitous in th eir forest, as w ell as an array of seasonal fruits. Insects pro vide several kinds of honey and larvae. M any species of vertebrates are hunted, som e w ith bows and arrow s and som e w ith sticks or by hand. C om m on prey range in size from capuchin m onkeys to w hite-lipped peccaries and occasionally tapirs.
As w ith the !Kung, acquisition and consum ption rates are m ore closely related for som e resources th an for o th ers. A m an acquires about 1,340 C al/h r. (Hill et al. 19 87) targeting largely m eat and honey. A bout 1 3 % of th a t is consum ed by his ow n fam ily (Kaplan 19 83, Kaplan and H ill 1985a) . M en also gather all the resources w om en do, bu t because w om en do n o t h u n t th eir acquisition rates suggest th e rates m en m ig h t earn if th ey focused on gathering. W om en earn from 1,220 to 2,800 C al/hr., depending on w h eth er th e ir travel is counted as foraging tim e (Hill et al. 19 8 7) . Of th is 47.5% is consum ed by th eir ow n fam ilies (Kaplan 19 83, Kaplan and H ill 1985a) . The differences in sharing depend on th e resources them selves. Food types show th e sam e distinctive shar ing patterns w hether they are acquired by m en or women, and m en preferentially target the ones th at are more widely shared (Hawkes 19 9 1). T he expected contri bution to the foragers' own fam ilies' consum ption is 174 C al/hr. (that is, 1 3 % of the acquisition rate) for targeting game and honey and 580 to 1,330 C al/hr. (47.5% of the acquisition rate) for targeting plant foods and larvae. Men get less for their own families by taking game and honey than they would by gathering plant foods and lar vae instead.
The Hadza live in the wooded savannah south and east of Lake Eyasi, northern Tanzania (Woodburn 1968 , Blurton Jones et al. 1992 ). In the past few decades they have been m uch less isolated than the Dobe !Kung or the Ache before the 1970s. In spite of the proxim ity of neighbors and repeated governm ental and m issionary a t tem pts to settle them , m any have continued to depend on hunting and gathering. Some have avoided settle m ents altogether, and m any people have repeatedly re turned to full-tim e foraging (Woodburn 1988 , Blurton [ones et al. 1992 Hawkes, O 'Connell, and Blurton Jones 1989, 19 9 1) . Local resources are sim ilar to those available to the IKung but m ore abundant. Hadza w om en collect tubers, berries, baobab, and tam arind and cooperate seasonally w ith m en in pursuit of honey. U n like the !Kung, Hadza m en are also specialized big-game hunters, taking prey ranging in size from im pala to gi raffe w ith bows and m etal-tipped poisoned arrows to earn an average of 4.9 kg/day (Hawkes, O 'Connell, and Blurton Jones 19 9 1). A lthough the technology is known to them, they m ake little use of snares or traps and gen erally pass by the sm all anim als frequently seen in this environm ent.
The m eat of large anim als is very widely shared not only in the hunter's own camp but w ith other camps as well. Assum ing conservatively th at a camp defines the sharing lim its and th at each h u n ter represents a family, then the m ean of about eight m en in a Hadza camp leaves the hu n ter w ith an average 1/8 of his acquisition or about 900 Cal/day. Tubers and berries are not so widely shared. W omen earn averages of about 4.5 kg/day from these resources (Hawkes, O 'Connell, and Blurton Jones 1989) or about 3,900 and 10,000 C al/day respec tively.3 If collected resources are consum ed by the fam ily of the gatherer, then as w ith the preceding cases m en earn substantially less for them selves and their families to consum e w hen they h u n t than if they had gathered.
The Hadza data illustrate a related dim ension of con trast along w hich resources vary: predictability. For a Hadza hunter, the probability of killing or scavenging a 3. The daily rates come from observations during September and October 1985 and March and April 1986 . Caloric values for the main species of tuber, Vigna frutescens, are 85 Cal/100 g, for the species of berry tabulated in Hawkes, O'Connell, and Blurton Jones (1989) , Grewia bicolor, 223 Cal/100 g (Galvin et al. n.d.] . large anim al on any given day is -0.03, m eaning that he faces a 0.97 risk of failure each day (Hawkes, O 'C on nell, and Blurton Jones 1991).4 This m akes hunting and scavenging large anim als an especially poor choice of foraging strategies if the goal is to m eet daily family consum ption needs. Moreover, w hen a h u n ter does hit, m ost of his kill goes to those outside his family. By con trast, small-game hunting and trapping fail far less often, gathering never, and in each case m ost if not all of the product goes to the forager's own family.
These three cases illustrate a general pattern among hunter-gatherers: some resources are m uch more widely shared than others. In taking the widely shared foods, foragers contribute m ost of w hat they acquire to others in the com m unity. Kaplan (1983; Kaplan and H ill 1985a) has dem onstrated th at for the Ache there is a correlation between sharing outside the nuclear family of the ac quirer and tw o resource characteristics: predictability and package size. The relationship holds at least qualita tively for the IKung and the Hadza as well.
Explaining Sharing: The Reciprocity Hypothesis
Why are unpredictable large-package resources so widely shared? A favorite hypothesis is th at the fraction given up to others is repaid in future by the shares they return. This variance-reduction (Kaplan 1983, Kaplan and Hill 198512, W interhalder 1986) , insurance (Cashdan 1985) , or reciprocal-altruism (Trivers 1 9 7 1 1 hypothesis proposes th at individuals exchange short-term surplus to increase their own consum ption payoff over time.
The resources m ost widely shared are the riskiest to pursue, those showing high variance in acquisition. Daily averaging does reduce consum ption variance. The pattern has long been noted by anthropologists (e. g., Sahlins 1972 , Gould 1982 and treated m ore formally by those drawing on behavioral ecology (Cashdan 1985 , W interhalder 1986 , Sm ith 1988 , Sm ith and Boyd 1990 . If the first un its of a large resource are w orth m ore than additional units, then sharing not only reduces the vari ance but also raises the average consum ption payoff for the sharers (Kaplan 1983, Kaplan and Hill 1985a) .
Assum ing a group of ten m em bers, the gain curve for consum ing additional units of a resource for any m em ber takes the shape indicated in figure 1 . If the resource is unpredictably acquired, then successes are uncorre lated. W hen one forager is successful and all ten group m em bers consum e one u n it each from th e lucky for ager's score, then, since the payoff for the first u n it is one consum ption payoff point and each consum er's unit is th at person's first, the total group payoff is ten. If, in 4. This is measured over 256 days of observation covering all sea sons 1985-89, 2,072 hunter-days. It is a very low rate but substan tially higher than the long-term big-game rate Lee estimates for the !Kung (2-3 animals/year). The difference in success rates can be related to differences in the work strategies men adopt (Hawkes 1990 contrast, only one m em ber consum es it all, th a t m em ber gets one p o in t for the first u n it b u t less for each addi tional u n it, resu ltin g in a to tal consum ption payoff of only two. C learly th e group does b etter if the good is shared. But does th a t m ean th a t individuals increase th eir ow n consum ption by sharing?
For the values assum ed here, the n ine u n its of th e good th a t others tak e are w orth a to tal of only one con su m ption payoff p o int to th e acquirer, once h e has his first unit. If in return for giving up those nine u n its he obligates th e others to pay h im back w hen they are lucky and he is not, he w ill gain by sharing. T his is th e insurance or risk-reduction argum ent: one gives up som ething today in order to receive som ething of greater value in future. It m u st be th e case, then, th a t those who do n o t give shares do n o t get them .
T he em pirical p icture does no t show th a t one m u st give to receive. In Lee's record of th e !Kung, som e forag ers provided m u ch m ore th a n others. O ne m an acquired -78% of th e m eat for th e entire cam p for a m onth. Of the o ther m en, four did no h u n tin g at all, b u t there is no indication th a t they w ere excluded. M arshall's char acterization of m eat sharing and Lee's endorsem ent indi cate th a t shares go to all.
In th e case of th e Ache, Kaplan and H ill (1985a) report up to sixfold differences in th e am ounts of food acquired by fam ilies over periods less th an tw o w eeks. Individual m en rank co n sisten tly from one year to th e next in both th eir success rates and th eir acquisition totals. Those who acquire at a higher rate also spend m ore tim e h u n t ing, increasing th eir disproportionate contribution to group co n su m p tio n (Hill and H aw kes 19 8 3). Yet there is no relationship betw een th e am ount a h u n te r acquires and th e am o u n t his fam ily consum es (Kaplan and H ill 1985a T he m eat any h u n te r acquired was eaten by all, including w om en, children, and m en w ho never contrib uted any m eat. People got shares w h eth er or no t they had been providing them .
In none of these cases is there evidence of repaym ent in kind to the providers. Tw o aspects of these patterns m erit fu rth er com m ent: the duration of observations and the focus on repaym ent in kind. T he absence of re paym ent is show n over lim ited tim e periods. Lee's w ork diaries covered a m onth. T he data used on individual Hadza h u n ters cover only 130 days. T he longest tim e period in th e A che data is th e com parison of h u n ters' rankings betw een tw o periods w ith in tw o years. T he h y pothesis th a t delays m ay be longer th an those captured ethnographically cannot be falsified. Longer tim e fram es m ight show repaym ent. T hree considerations are rele vant to this hypothesis. First, w hen Axelrod (1984; Axel rod and H am ilton 19 8 1 ) used com puter tournam en ts to investigate th e success of strategies of cooperation in two-player sequences, he found th a t strategies in w hich a player's m ove was contingent only on the opponent's last play out-com peted rivals w ith longer "m em ories." Those w ho quickly forgot the past w ere m ore successful because they avoided th e costly sequences of reprisals th at befell those w ho held grudges. Second, a consider ation also em phasized by Axelrod, long delays betw een a benefit given and one returned m ake reciprocity diffi cult to sustain because of the sharp increases in dis counting of future benefits w ith increasing delay. Empir ical evidence of the high rate at w hich people discount the value of future benefits [e.g., Logue 1988} is consis ten t w ith this general point. Third, the hypothesis that benefits are returned after delays of longer duration leaves continuing contributions from those who have not been repaid unexplained. If foragers gave up shares to ensure repaym ent, then no one would have reason to continue to give to those already in his debt.
R epaym ent in kind is the test of the variancereduction hypothesis because sharing is proposed to be the hedge against probable failure to capture unpredictably acquired resources. If, as others have suggested (e.g., Hill 1985a, W interhalder 1986) , those who provide shares are com pensated in some other form, the advantage to the share givers is not reduced variance in their consum ption of the risky resource. Im provements for the "average group m em ber" can hide differences in costs and benefits for different m em bers. All m ay do better if they all share than if none do, but some may do better not to share if others do.
Sharing as "Tolerated Theft7'
If w hat ethnologists label "reciprocity" is rarely literally reciprocal (Sahlins 1965) the question remains: if one need not give to receive, why give? Building on Maynard Sm ith and Parker's w ork on contests over resources, Blurton Jones (1984 , 1987 has suggested a m odel of "to l erated theft." He points out th at if resources are large and asynchronously acquired, then one forager's suc cessful capture will be of potential consum ption value to many. If the acquirer tries to consum e it all, the con sum ption payoff gained from each additional u n it con sumed w ill be less than the consum ption payoff hungry others would get from those sam e units (as in figure 1 ). If individuals can afford to invest m ore in a contest when they have m ore to gain from winning, those who have consum ed less can afford to fight harder. If ac quirers cannot afford to fight as hard for additional por tions, they w ill do better no t to contest the claims of others at all. The resources are "shared" because the cost to an acquirer of no t sharing is too high. Kaplan and H ill (1985a) and Kaplan, Hill, and Hurtado (1990) have argued th at if the physical contest were deci sive, then differences in resource-holding potential (i.e., differences in the cost of a fight to different individuals) would determ ine the distribution. Yet size and strength, w hich usually determ ine resource-holding potential in other anim als, have no effect on the shares people get. In none of the ethnographic cases do the biggest and strongest m en take everything. Women, sm all children, old people, and even people not present at the tim e get shares. Some of this m ay still relate to physical costs. People m ay choose to avoid the rage they could antici pate if a strong neighbor returned to find nothing but the evidence of a finished meal. W hen a child is relieved of a desirable share of honey in a Hadza camp, wails of protest can quickly draw the child's m other and others as well . Blurton Jones (1987) suggests th at because peo ple can apply lethal force against each other, differences in "overkill capacity" m ay no t m atter. Deadly weapons may have a long history as "equalizers." This would m ake resource-holding potential m ore generally sim ilar among hum ans than among other prim ates. Are there other costs as well?
Ethnologists have long used contrasts in patterns of "exchange" to distinguish traditional kinship com m uni ties from those of m odem states. M auss (1967 [1925] ! noted th at in archaic societies there are no neutral strangers; people are either friends or enemies. Friends give gifts; giving gifts m aintains friendly relationships. W hite (1959) suggested th at there are tw o kinds of econ omies, those in w hich the value of item s exchanged gov erns transfers and those in w hich the social relationship between the parties to the transfer governs. Polanyi (1957) described transfers in m arketless societies as em bedded in social relationships. These scholars, none di rectly influenced by the others, argued th at in traditional societies the transfer of valuable item s depends on social relationships. To refuse or interfere w ith transfers is to deny the social relationships and the com m on interest they represent.
These ideas point to a cost distinct from physical in jury that, though elusive, could have substantial fitness consequences. W hen one person tries to exclude another from using som ething th a t is of greater value to that other he incites hostility and aggression or at least pas sive enm ity. W hen goods come unpredictably in large am ounts, m any are drawn to the rich resource patches created by the acquisitions of a few. The cost of interfer ing w ith transfers to those w ith less could be overt con flict.
Recently hunter-gatherer ethnographers have charac terized the transfers they observe (and participate in) as "dem and" sharing (Ingold, Riches, and Woodburn 1988) . Bird-David (1990 , 1992 notes the framing of demands in term s not of repaym ent for past generosity b u t of current inequities: "Give to m e because I have none," "Give to m e because I am needier than you," "Give to m e be cause you have so m uch." This suggests calculation in term s of the costs and benefits noted by Blurton Jones (1984 , 1987 , who recalls the edge of hostility com m on in ethnographic accounts of sharing. The transfers he labels tolerated theft occur only w hen there are m arked disparities in holdings. If resources are acquired by many in synchrony, if everybody has coincident luck, good or bad, there is no basis for dem anding transfers. If re sources come in sm all lumps, there will be little extra that one values less than another. N o one's acquisition presents a valuable patch for others to exploit.
The label "tolerated theft" should not be taken to im ply th at goods belong to the acquirer. T he model ad dresses the trade-offs individuals face in the absence of well-defined property rights. A good is held for con sum ption only to the extent th at the holder can exclude other users. Potential contestants determ ine the cost of exclusion, w h ich can m u ltip ly w ith th e n um ber of com petitors. In th e absence of w ell-defined property rights, th e value of th e things one can accum ulate depends on w hat everyone else has.
Public Goods and the Logic of Collective Action
Goods th a t are large and acquired asynchronously create patches of h igh relative value. Because th e alternative to getting som e is having none, they have high exclusion costs. If th e exclusion costs are high enough, the goods are effectively public goods; they can be consum ed by those w ho do n o t pay th e cost of acquiring th em di rectly, and individuals serve th eir ow n in tere st by allo cating th eir foraging tim e to o ther resources w hile con sum ing th em for free. Influential trea tm e n ts of the public-goods problem have a history of several centuries, m ostly associated w ith th e origin and proper role of the state. Form al treatm en ts begin w ith Sam uelson (1954), w ho assum ed tw o categories of goods, "private" and "collective." H e em phasized the distin ctio n betw een goods th a t can be "parcelled ou t am ong tw o or m ore persons, w ith one m an having a loaf less if another gets a loaf m ore," and those in w hich each person can con sum e th e w hole thing-bread vs. circuses (Samuelson 1 9 5 s ) . M uch discussion has ensued about th e defining characteristics of public goods. Tw o are "jointness of supply" (as in Sam uelson's in itial discussion, th e sam e u n it can be consum ed by all) and "nonexcludability" (consum ers can n o t be excluded from th e good w hether or n o t they pay). Food is often cited as th e classic illus tratio n of a private good. But if one person bakes a loaf of bread and th e cost of refusing a slice to another is too high to be w o rth paying, th e n th e loaf is n o t a perfectly private good. Paradoxically, certain kinds of foods pre sent a k ind of public-goods problem of great antiquity in h u m an experience, greater th a n th a t of th e com m on pasture used as an illu stra tio n by H ardin (19 6 8 ). If th e cost of excluding others from shares of large, unpredictably acquired anim als is too high to pay, th e problem is as old as th e h u n tin g or com petitive scavenging of big game.
In 19 6 5 O lson dem onstrated th a t th e logic of collec tive action w as extrem ely general, arising w henever m em bers of a group have a com m on goal. T his develop m en t in econom ics paralleled events in evolutionary bi ology, w here at the sam e tim e W illiam s (19 6 6 ) was show ing th e im portance of distinguishing group and in dividual interests. Econom ists also recognized the gen eral im portance of distinguishing costs and benefits ex ternal to th e accounts of a decision m aker and the determ ining effects these externalities can have on so cial outcom es.
If som e resources w ill be collective goods, th e con su m p tio n payoffs foragers can expect depend n o t only on w hich resources they target b u t also on w hich resources others choose. W hen th e costs and benefits for a pattern of behavior depend on how m any others do th e sam e thing, th e payoffs are said to be "frequency-dependent." Evolutionary gam e theory (M aynard S m ith 19 8 2 , Parker and M aynard S m ith 19 9 0 ) provides th e analytical tools for identifying optim al strategies w hen payoffs are fre quency-dependent. G am es can be sym m etric (all players confronting th e sam e payoffs) or asym m etric. T hey can involve tw o or m ore players and tw o or m ore possible strategies, and th e strategies them selves m ay or m ay not be contingent on anything about th e game. T he contests m ay be "one-shot gam es" or repeated sequences w ith w innings evaluated over a series of plays.
A very sim ple m odel of th e consum ption trade-offs foragers m ight face can be m odeled as a sym m etric nperson game w ith tw o alternative strategies: foragers can target either collective goods (those of w hich others w ill successfully dem and shares) or private goods (those not w idely dem anded by others). Because th e topic here is food resources, th e goods are divisible, and a u n it of the good can be used by only one consum er (in contrast, for example, to th e situ atio n w ith co m m unity defense, w hich is jointly supplied and w ould be m odeled differ ently).
In the payoff m atrix of table 1 , B is th e value of collec tive good one forager can acquire, b is th e value of p ri vate good, and n is th e num ber of foragers in th e group. T he m atrix depicts th e boundary conditions. T he left colum n shows th e payoffs to row w hen all others target the collective good; th e right colum n show s row 's pay offs w hen all others target private goods. If row targets the collective good and all others do too (the upper left cell), row gets 1 In of th e nB provided. T aking th e private good instead (the low er left cell), row gets i / n of the [n -1 ) B provided by th e others plus th e private good. If row is th e only one to target collective goods (the upper right cell), th e n nothing com es from th e others and row keeps i / n of th e B. If no one targets collective goods, row gets only th e private good. In th is m odel, the dom inant or evolutionarily stable (M aynard S m ith 19 8 2 ) strategy depends on th e relationship betw een B /n and b. If B /n > b, th en row does b etter to target th e collec tive good w hatever th e others do,-targeting th e collec tive good is th e evolutionarily stable strategy. But if B / n < b , then th e evolutionarily stable strategy is targeting the private good. T he situ atio n in w hich B /n < b and B > b is th e w ell-know n "prisoner's dilem m a" (Luce and Raiffa 19 5 7 ).
The prisoner's dilem m a illu strates w h a t O lson called the logic of collective action. U nder m ost circum stances the m em bers of a group w ill n o t provide the am o u n t of a good com m on to all th at would be in the best interest of the m em bers collectively. Only where the acquisition rates for collective goods are n tim es higher than for private goods (where foragers' own i / n of the collective good is greater than they could get from targeting the private good) w ill foragers m axim ize their consum ption payoff by procuring the collective good.
The payoff m atrix shows in general form the trade-offs indicated in the data assembled above from the IKung, Ache, and Hadza. In each of these cases, foragers earn more for their own fam ily consum ption by pursuing pri vate goods on their own and claim ing shares of any col lective goods provided by others.
In the IKung case, a m an who gathers can expect a family consum ption rate of 4,000-6,000 C al/day for that work plus 2,564 Cal on average from every big-game hunter (if ^T o m a's performance in July 1964 is repre sentative). The big-game h u n ter can expect only 2,564 Cal/day for his own fam ily plus his fam ily's share from every other big-game hunter.
An Ache m an who targets plant foods w ill get 580-1,330 C al/hr. for his fam ily (47.5% of his acquisi tion) plus a bit from other collectors (his fam ily's share of the 52.5% shared out by each) and his fam ily's share of the 1,166 C al/hr. shared out by each hunter. By con trast a hunter, though he gets the bit shared out by col lectors and the shares from other hunters, foregoes the 580-1,330 C al/hr. from his own gathering for the 174 C al/hr. th at is his own share of the game he bags.
A Hadza m an will get 3,900-10,000 C al/day for his family from gathering plant foods and can claim about 900 C al/day from every hunter. If he hunted himself, he could expect to keep about 900 Cal from his own kills plus his 900 Cal share from each other hunter. In each of these cases, if m en sought the foraging alternative that gave them the highest family consum ption, they would gather rather than hunt, targeting private instead of collective goods.
Measuring Nutritional Payoffs
Energy can be a poor m easure of nutritional utility when comparing resources w ith very different nutrient com positions (Hill et al. 1987 (Hill et al. , H ill 1988 . Gathered resources usually have sm all fractions of fats and proteins, though nuts (like mongongos) are a notable exception. Hunted resources are alm ost entirely composed of fats and pro teins. If the nutritional value of an additional u n it of these nutrients varies both w ith the total am ount of food available and w ith the n u trien t com position of that total (Hill 1988) , the relative consum ption payoffs for a hunter's fraction of his score m ay be underestim ated. Hill (1988) m akes the usual assum ptions-the ones under question here-th at acquisition choices are m oti vated by consum ption goals and th at acquisition approx im ately equals consum ption. They allow him to use data on acquisition rates for different resources and the com position of forager diets to infer differing marginal rates of substitution for these m acronutrients. He argues that if an Ache m an could earn 2,800 C al/hr. gathering but hunts and stops for honey to get 1,340 C al/hr. in stead, then he m u st value the second kind of calories at more than tw ice the first. If we consider his rate for hunting only, then he chooses 910 C al/hr. of m eat over 2,800 C al/hour of gathered food, valuing m eat more than three tim es as m uch as gathered resources. If the m ultiplier is large enough, then for the model of table 1 , i / n of the B m ay be greater than b. This will m ake the collective action problem disappear because foragers m axim ize their own nutritional gains by targeting the collective goods. For the Ache, the protein and fat m u lti plier (P) w ould have to be large enough to satisfy the inequality 1 3 % (910P + 430) > 47.5% (2,800)-greater than ro.77. For the IKung, the m acronutrient com posi tion of both mongongo n u ts and m eat is fat and protein. This ought to inflate the value of rare carbohydrates but suggests no m ultipliers for the alternatives considered here. For the Hadza, for B ln to be greater than b, assum ing n to be 8 (a num ber of families), P would have to satisfy P 900 > 3,900-10 ,000. P would have to be greater than 4.3 and som etim es greater than 1 1 .
The com plexity introduced by comparing foods w ith different m acronutrients can be avoided where both col lective and private goods are composed of the same m ac ronutrients, perhaps mongongo nuts and m eat for the IKung, m ore certainly large and sm all game. Among the Ache, m en and w om en take the same nongame re sources. W ithin this set, carbohydrates only, some re sources are m ore widely shared (Kaplan 1983, Kaplan and Hill 198512) . If there were no differences in return rates, foragers seeking to m axim ize their family con sum ption should target the private goods, those less widely shared. W om en do, but m en take more of the collective resources (Hawkes 19 9 1). This suggests that, as w hen they hunt, m en do not gather to m axim ize their fam ily's consum ption but target collective goods in stead.
In the case of the Hadza, m acronutrients can be held constant by comparing m eat acquisition strategies, one targeting collective and the other private goods. U nlike the IKung or the Ache, Hadza hunters are big-game spe cialists; only about 1 % of the weight of game taken comes from sm all anim als (Hawkes, O'Connell, and Blurton Jones 19 9 1). Yet sm all game is abundant in their habitat, and on rare occasions m en set snares. Hawkes et al. report an experim ent in w hich a sample of Hadza m en agreed to h u n t sm all anim als and set snares for a sequence of days to see w hat incom es they could earn this way. W hen sm all anim als are taken they are not widely shared. R esults showed th at m ean earnings were m uch lower than for big game but th at failure rates were m uch lower as well. A m odel based on these m easure m ents showed that, as in the payoff m atrix of table 1 , if m en sought to m axim ize their chances of feeding m eat to their children they would h u n t or trap sm all anim als instead of targeting large anim als only. T hat model at tended to the variance in returns ignored in the model here. The high long-term m ean daily rate for Hadza biggame hunters (a function of the enorm ous size of their h a w k e s Why Huntei-Gatheiers Work | 349 prey) obscures m any days of failure. T his extrem e vari ance could have especially large effects on children. C ontinuing research on n u tritio n a l payoffs for different food types and on th e effects of different consum ption schedules is clearly in order. We need to know w hat difference it m akes for a consum er to receive a large portion of m eat rarely (e.g., 2 kg every three weeks) or a sm all am o u n t m ore frequently (e.g., 50 g each day) and how th is effect varies w ith age and sex.
T hese considerations show th a t in at least som e cases a higher value placed on th e m acronutrients in a shared good could m ak e th e public-goods problem disappear. Yet a very ro bust p a tte rn in resource choice w ould re m ain even if large m ultipliers w ere justified. Foraging m en tend to target w idely shared resources. !Kung, Ache, and H adza m en all spend substantial (though quite different) am ounts of tim e supplying collective goods. T he conclusion supported by th is analysis is th a t under a w ide array of circum stances they w ould not tar get these resources if th ey sought to m axim ize th eir ow n or th eir fam ily's consum ption.
Selective Incentives
The payoff m atrix of table 1 suggests possible benefits distinct from co n sum ption of th e good itself. W ith the payoffs represented in th e m atrix, individuals w ho ac quire collective goods increase th eir neighbors' con sum ption in stead of th eir ow n fam ilies'. Foragers do b et ter to choose neighbors w ho provide collective goods. If there are advantages to being preferred as a neighbor, individuals can gain th em by trading off th e consum p tio n advantages from targeting private goods and supply ing collective goods instead. A dvantages m ay include deference in decisions about travel, support in disputes (or at least reluctance on th e part of others to side against them ), and enhanced m atin g opportunities. Pref erences in association w ill be likely to have fitness con sequences for any social anim al-th e m ore intensely so cial, th e stronger th e effect.
T he social benefits to be gained from providing collec tive goods w ill be frequency-dependent, th e am ount of benefits one can capture depending on how m any others supply collective goods. T his can be m odeled by assum ing th at no m a tte r w h a t others do, each individual spends an am o u n t of social atten tio n w orth S to those receiving it, and further, th a t (1 ) all serve th eir ow n in terests by paying a sim ilar am o u n t of social attention, (2 ) each individual allocates his or her social atten tio n preferentially to those w ho target collective goods, (3) receiving social a tte n tio n is a fitness benefit, and (4) m ore atten tio n is b etter th a n less.
A very sim ple scenario provides a rationale for th e first tw o assum ptions. If individuals m on ito r cues in th eir env iro n m en t to alert th em to both opportunities and dangers (e.g., food and predators), th e n th e behavior of others like them selves can provide an im portant set of cues. Individuals find it in th eir in tere st to pay som e am o u n t of social atten tio n . If som e of those they w atch are m ore often associated w ith opportunities for con sum ption, th e n individuals w ill find it in th eir in terest to distribute th eir a tte n tio n accordingly.
T he second tw o assum ptions rely on an argum ent about th e use of signals. If signaling plays a role in gain ing m ates and allies and in adjusting the behavior of com petitors, th e n there can be an advantage in having one's signals heard earlier and m ore widely. Those w ho receive preferential a tte n tio n are (other things th e same) followed m ore and responded to m ore quickly. A ssoci ates are th u s m ore readily available to th em as allies and m ates and less likely to side against th em in disputes.
T he boundaries of a sy m m etrical 12-person gam e illu s trating these payoffs appear in th e payoff m atrix of table 2 . H ere th e benefit is n o t fam ily consum ption b u t social attention. As in th e previous game, n is th e nu m b er of individuals in th e group. H ere S is the benefit of all the atten tio n from one group m em ber. Entries show th e so cial payoffs to row. If row targets collective goods and all others do too (the upper left cell), row gets a 1 In share of the S from all other (22 -1 ) group m em bers. If row is the only one to provide th e collective good, row gets all the atten tio n (the upper right cell). If row targets the private good and all others target th e collective good (the low er left cell), th en all th e a tte n tio n goes to others. If no one targets th e collective good, th e n th e social a tte n tion is equally or random ly distributed (the low er right cell). Since social a tte n tio n is th e only benefit counted in this game, no m a tte r how sm all S is, as long as it is positive, row does b etter to target th e collective good. Even though row earns no m ore social atten tio n w hen all target the collective good th an w hen none do, entries in th e top row are always higher. T he evolutionarily sta ble strategy is targeting the collective good.
O lson (1965:60-6 1 ) noted th a t in sm all groups social incentives could readily solve th e public-goods problem , bu t h e did n o t go on to ask w hy individuals should re spond to social pressure by contributing collective goods. T he trea tm e n t here points in th e direction of an evolutionary basis for th a t social pressure and its effects. Those w ho prefer com panions likely to provide collec tive goods accrue consum ption advantages for this pref erence. T he fitness advantage to collective-good provid ers is th e a tte n tio n th ey get as a consequence. Those w ho happen to be present to consum e the collective good cannot continue to free-ride on th e atten tio n paid by others as long as th e collective good appears unpredictably. O nly by paying a tte n tio n to th e location and activity of th e collective-good suppliers do they con- Second-order public-goods problems often lurk in ap parent solutions. Since incentives to collective-good pro viders m ust them selves be private goods (i.e., benefits th at only providers get), supplying the incentives can engage the logic of collective action. If some award the attention th at m otivates the suppliers but others can regularly consum e the collective good w ithout paying the price of attention, then attention w ill be underpro vided. This model avoids th at problem by assum ing that those who pay atten tio n to suppliers are m ore often around to consum e w hat they supply. There is then no incentive to "cheat." Connor (1986) has suggested the label "pseudo-reciprocity" to distinguish cases such as these from the trading of delayed benefits.
The assum ption that suppliers get real benefits from attention alone because it m akes their signals and invi tations heard first m ore often by m ore others is quite general. Anyone m ight seek these benefits. W hether the actual value of such a signaling advantage could be very large rem ains to be investigated. The m odel is very sen sitive to the assum ptions about private benefits to all parties. If consum ers got the sam e am ount of collective good w hether or not they paid attention to providers, then those not paying attention could free-ride. If con sumers were around to get shares m ore often w hen they paid attention but were no m ore likely to respond to invitations and directions of suppliers even though they heard them first, then the incentives to collective-good providers would disappear. In a less general model of some of th e sam e trade-offs, I used an asym m etric game w ith gender differences and tw o strategies available for m en and two for w om en (Hawkes 1990) . Private benefits to collective-good providers (who were called "showoffs"! were m ating opportunities, and private benefits to m ating-opportunity providers were survival advantages to their children fathered by showoffs. The treatm ent here has the advantage of greater sim plicity and general ity, but the private benefits are less readily illustrated w ith em pirical examples.
The m odels are of course too sim ple to capture w hat actually goes on in foraging com m unities. Yet even the few variables in the general models are enough to show th at two kinds of payoffs, family consum ption and social attention, can trade off against each other. If so, those whose goal is to m axim ize their fam ily's food consum p tion should choose private goods and those whose goal is to m axim ize their social benefits should not. As w ith all trade-off problems, the optim al solution m ay be to provide only private or only collective goods or some m ix of the two. Particular solutions w ill depend on the relative values of the tw o kinds of benefits-the m ar ginal costs and benefits of additional units of tim e allo cated one way or the other. These depend in tu rn on an individual's own characteristics and on local ecology.
Implications
The m ost general im plication of the data and argum ent presented here is th at hunters often do not get the food consum ption benefits from their w ork that have gener ally been assumed. This has special relevance to three issues arising in scenarios of hum an evolution, at least two of w hich are also relevant to the study of publicgoods problems. First, the analysis challenges the view that hunting or com petitive scavenging is generally a kind of paternal investm ent among hum an foragers. Sec ond, data reviewed do not support the proposition that variance reduction or delayed-return reciprocity ex plains sharing in foraging com m unities. Third, characteris tics of the resources foragers exploit combined w ith smallcom m unity social life impose trade-offs between consum p tion benefits and social benefits. These trade-offs are not unique to m odem circum stances, suggesting a link be tween features of subsistence resources and selection pressures on the character of hum an social behavior.
A striking im plication of this argum ent involves dif ferences in foraging behavior by sex. If the fitness values of social attention and fam ily food consum ption differ for m en and w om en and if these are com peting benefits, then m en and w om en ought to prefer different trade offs and choose to forage for different resources. Gender differences in foraging strategies are of course the usual pattern among ethnographically know n huntergatherers, but this sexual division of labor is generally assumed to arise because it efficiently serves family pro duction goals. One striking difference between hum ans and other prim ates is th at m en contribute to group food consum ption, bu t I have argued that, in spite of authori tative contrary assertions (Washburn and Lancaster 1968, Lovejoy 19 8 1, Lancaster and Lancaster 1983, Alex ander 1990), m uch of this contribution is not paternal investm ent. T he m aterial reviewed shows th at m en of ten choose the very resources least likely to give con sum ption advantages to their own nuclear families. This choice can neither depend on nor reinforce either m ar riage or confidence of paternity. Anthropologists have long noted th at w om en m ake trade-offs w ith child care th at m en do no t (Brown 1970 , M urdock and Provost 1973 , H urtado 1985 , H urtado et al. 1985 . The argum ent here is th at an additional trade-off plays an im portant role in foraging strategies. Family n u tritio n as compared w ith alliance and m ating advantages w ill often give dif ferent relative fitness payoffs by sex because of the same fundam ental asym m etries th at lead w om en to invest m ore in child care than do men.
These asym m etries m ay som etim es be subtle. Con sum ption and socal benefits w ill be valuable to both m en and women, bu t m arginal fitness gains for invest m ent in each w ill often differ. T he food th at a woman, her young children, and her reproductive daughter con sum e day by day w ill have a large im pact on her repro ductive success through effects on her fecundability and the survivorship and fertility of her offspring. A t the same tim e, w om en have less to gain (or lose) in disput ing other w om en over m ating access to m en than m en have to gain (or lose) in contests over access to women. This difference is especially great w here property rights are poorly defined and therefore m ates are n o t valued for th eir w ealth. Still, under som e circum stances, w om en m ay use social atte n tio n to gain assistance in child care from o th er w om en.
Offspring survivorship w ill affect a m an 's reproduc tive success as w ell as a w om an's, and his ow n general n u tritio n a l statu s w ill affect his fitness. U nder som e ecological circum stances fam ily provisioning m ay be his best bet, b u t un d er m any others th e num ber of his m a t ing opportunities and h is success in disputes w ith other m en over m ating w ill likely have larger effects. M en w ill usually have m ore to gain from additional m ates th an w ill w om en. Since any m an w ho gets m ore pater nity th an o th er m en subtracts directly from his com peti to rs' reproductive success, arm s races in m ating com pe titio n am ong m en can readily develop. It is consistent w ith th e sim ple m odels here th a t if social atten tio n can be gained from supplying collective goods and if it gives higher fitness retu rn s th a n fam ily provisioning, then w hen one m an seeks social attention, others m u st fol low su it or lose out. T he correlation betw een huntingsuccess rank and m easures of reproductive success am ong th e A che m en (Kaplan and H ill 19 85b) is consis te n t w ith th is argum ent.
Because of th e association betw een sharing and re source predictability, anthropologists have postulated risk reduction as an explanation for sharing. T his expla n atio n requires n o t only th a t those w ho provide shares for others receive shares them selves b u t also th a t those w ho do n o t provide shares do n o t receive them . This contingency is n o t observed em pirically. In fact, it is the lack of quid pro quo in sharing p atterns th a t has long draw n th e a tte n tio n of ethnologists (Lee 1979; Sahlins 1965 Sahlins , 1972 ,; H aw kes 1992b). Some have considered the opening such sharing gives to "freeloaders" and have suggested th a t sanctions such as w itchcraft accusations (more likely to fall on anyone of deviant laziness) keep people w orking (e.g., H arris 1989). Aside from th e public-goods problem s th is poses (e.g., Boyd and R icherson 1992), it leaves salient aspects of th e em pirical reports unexplained. T hese show "m o st people" w orking some, som e people (often th e m o st efficient) w orking relatively hard (e.g., H ill and H aw kes 19 83, H aw kes et al. 1985 , H aw kes 19 8 7). If people w orked only hard enough to m eet a m in im u m requirem ent set by the am o u n t others worked, th e frequency-dependent standard w ould be prone to slide low er and low er as any w orking harder th an th e cu rren t average reduced th eir effort.
Some have suggested th a t repaym ent to those w ho w ork harder and give m ore m ay be very long delayed, even indirect (e.g., A lexander 19 8 7). Form al m odeling so far show s in d irect reciprocity to be at least as fragile (Boyd and R icherson r 989) as th e direct exchange of de layed benefits (e.g., Boyd and R icherson 1988, M artinez Coll and H irshleifer 19 9 1, H aw kes 1992a). Perhaps m ore im portant, a m odel of indirect reciprocity fails to supply any explanatory lin k s betw een particular resource char acteristics, predictable differences in the ex ten t to w hich resources are shared, and associated patterns in resource choice.
T he tolerated-theft m odel show s how th e econom ics of defensibility can m ake "ow nership" negotiable. W hen large anim als are procured unpredictably, excluding claim ants from access m ay be too expensive. T he h u n te r him self cannot afford to exclude others, nor can anyone else. If th e h u n te r or an o th er tried to channel a large fraction to favor a friend, th e friend w ould face dem ands for shares in turn. W ith property rights under such con tinuing negotiation, large asynchronously acquired re sources are collective goods. Like th a t of any collective good, the consum ption value of th e resource is rarely sufficient reason to procure it. However, selective in cen tives w ill m otiv ate suppliers.
Some aspects of th e lives of contem porary foragers can be linked to special circum stances of th e m odern world. T he environm ents people exploit now differ from those of the past; regional histories often involve com plex in terdependencies betw een ethnographic subjects and their neighbors. People observed as foragers m ay have ancestors w ho m ade th eir livings in other ways. T his can lead investigators to be suspicious of th e relevance of hunter-gatherer ethnography to an understanding of our evolutionary history. But som e of th e lim its and choices th a t people confront from day to day w hen they m ake th eir living by h u n tin g and gathering exem plify constraints and trade-offs of great antiquity. T his pro vides an o pportunity to evaluate theoretically m otivated hypotheses and m ay stim u late th e developm ent of new ones.
If the trade-off betw een fam ily consum ption and so cial atten tio n underlies th e resource choices of m odern foragers, it is a trade-off w ith a long history. Paradoxi cally, this very " m a te ria list" evolutionary econom ics anticipates th e problem th a t n o t all incentives are " m a terial." M odeling and m easuring b o th social and familyconsum ption benefits w ill help us understand n o t only variation in resource choice am ong foragers b u t also variation in cooperation and tendencies to supply other collective goods in these and o th er h u m an co m m u nities.
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H aw kes seeks to replace th e orthodox reciprocity m odel of hunter-gatherer sharing of gam e w ith a public-goods m odel w hich postulates th a t m edium -sized and large game are regarded as com m on property in th e sense th a t they are ow ned and consum ed by all. T his com m ent uses A ustralian data to argue th a t large gam e has charac teristics of a private good, th a t th e sharing of gam e is an effective risk-m inim ising strategy, and th a t ecological constraints regularly lim it th e choice of h u n tin g stra t egy. T he data w ere collected in w estern A rnhem Land Among Gunwinggu, sharing of game is an extrem ely com plicated process, and at best fieldworkers can trace only first-round distribution. Even such distribution is com plicated by a range of factors including the ritual status of the hunter, the kin relations of fellow hunters and coresidents, the size of the residential group, and seasonal and ritual consum ption restrictions. There is certainly a cultural expectation th at large game w ill be widely shared, but in practice this m ay not occur be cause of com peting obligations. The only sure way of guaranteeing game to one's im m ediate fam ily is to be the successful hunter. Paradoxically, at times, ritual re strictions m ay result in the successful h unter's being excluded from consum ption, but his im m ediate family, usually residing in the sam e household or household cluster, w ill partake of his share. In short, there is a m aterial incentive to succeed. This view is supported by quantitative data collected among Gunwinggu: success ful hunters received m ore game (Altman 19 87:129-50).
There are opporunities for the successful to restrict wider distribution by, for example, consum ing large game where hunted, and such action can be observed (by fieldworkers, at any rate), but this is counter to cultural norms. As one generally coresides w ith kin, there is little reason to exclude these people from access to game. Furtherm ore, in tropical Australia large game has a very lim ited life: it m ust be consum ed quickly or it rots. The fact that game is not a public good is very evident w hen hunters com petitively bid for a share of hunted game. At tim es, people go to extraordinary lengths to deliver an im m ediate surplus to kin rather than m erely allowing camp coresidents to share in con sum ption.
Hawkes alludes to longitudinal data dem onstrating that sharing does not result in balanced reciprocity in the long term , but I find this unconvincing. I am not aware of any ethnography th at includes quantitative data for a group over a long enough period to assess w hether the distribution of game balances over time. Q uantitative data collected w ith Gunwinggu over one seasonal cycle indicated no t only th at sharing greatly am eliorated household variations in production but also th at resources flowed in a predictable direction: from households w ith young, dynamic, and productive h u n t ers to those w ith older, m ore ritually senior and less productive m en.
Hawkes assum es that hunters face a sim ple choice of resources to target; she accepts as unproblem atic the com m on and som ew hat oversimplified view in huntergatherer studies th at gathered resources are both predict able and available w hile the hunting of game is both unpredictable and high-risk. Such a view overlooks eco logical factors th at greatly constrain resource choice dur ing some seasons. For example, among Gunwinggu, large game was the subsistence staple during the w et season, heavily supplem ented, in the contem porary con text, by store-bought carbohydrates. It is unclear how "the carbohydrate gap" w ould have been bridged under traditional conditions, w hen seasonality and flooding greatly restricted the availability of alm ost all gathered foods. This was, w ithout doubt, a tim e of relative dietary hardship (Altman 1987 (Altman , M eehan 1982 . A collective hunting strategy m ay have been essential to m eet a group's m inim um dietary requirem ents, but even at this tim e game was not necessarily a collective resource.
Hawkes presents nonproducing consum ers as free loaders, but this view very m uch depends on cultural perceptions of w ho should produce, restrictions on po tential producers, people's other recognised specialities, and so on. There is no doubt th a t freeloaders can be a source of extrem e contention and disputation among hunter-gatherers, but in such circum stances effective strategies are adopted: subgroups m ay collude to con sum e game w here slaughtered, or people m ay lie about their returns, sneaking game into camp late at night. Eventually disputes m ay erupt th at result in changes in the com position of coresiding groups and the tem porary abandonm ent or expulsion of freeloaders.
U ltim ately, Hawkes ends w ith a conundrum . A m ate rialist m odel grounded in the neoclassical-econom ic concept of public goods concludes w ith the cultural ex planation th at social benefits accrue to successful h u n t ers. Hawkes provides no em pirical support for the hy pothesis th at success in hunting game as a public good converts to accum ulated individual social benefit, pre sum ably as a private good. This is a hypothesis w ith w hich "m ainstream " social anthropologists and huntergatherer specialists would be very comforable, but it is im m aterial to the argum ent w hether game is or is not a public good.
S T E P H E N B E C K E R M A N
Anthropology D epartm ent, Pennsylvania State
University, U niversity Park, Pa. 16802, U.S.A. 1 111 93 Hawkes has taken h er custom ary hard look at fam iliar anthropological assum ptions and come up w ith a typi cally provocative reinterpretation. Salutary as the exer cise is, tw o cautions are in order.
The first: The variance-reduction hypothesis for shar ing of unpredictable large-package resources should not be discarded hastily. Variance reduction is not incom patible w ith using sharing for the acquisition of social benefits; the argum ent m u st be th at the latter is a stronger influence on sharing behavior, not th at the lat ter logically excludes the former. The argum ent for the relative unim portance of variance reduction has some soft spots. The Ache, Hadza, and !Kung data runs failing to verify food repaym ent are all short w ith respect to the life-span of the organism. Axelrod's com puter tour nam ents, in w hich im m ediate tit-for-tat strategies outcompeted strategies w ith longer mem ories, provided no opportunity for the sort of pleading and haranguing prom inent in the ethnographic literature about huntergatherer sharing. (While description of current inequities h a w k e s Why Huntez-Gatherers Woik | 353 m ay be p ro m in en t in dem ands for sharing, it strains cre dulity to argue th a t m em ories of past generosity are u n im p o rtan t to th o se on w hom th e dem ands are made. The literatu re bursts w ith accounts of th e w eight of reci procity in egalitarian societies.) T he trade-off betw een increasing or regularizing th e food consum ption of the adult m ale's ow n fam ily and increasing or regularizing th at of o th er fam ilies (for social a tte n tio n payoffs) is ru dim entarily posed. If (as w ill often be th e case in hunting-and-gathering societies) m an y of th e other fam ilies are those of ego's brothers, sisters, and brothers-in-law and th eir offspring are nieces and nephew s, th e n ego has a fitness in tere st in th e food consum ption of all these people. It is an in tere st th a t m ay be served no t only by giving th em gam e to eat bu t also by giving th em game to give aw ay in turn, so th a t th eir generosity m ay influ ence th e futu re behavior of others tow ard them . Adding these considerations to th e n u tritio n a l payoffs (particu larly to children) of th e high-quality n u trien ts often sup plied by th e large gam e favored by m en leads to a less th an robust rejection of th e variance-reduction hypothe sis. T he m ajor p o int of H aw kes's article, th a t variance reduction alone is probably insufficient to explain the foraging options pursued by m en, rem ains.
T he second: T he idea of social attention, a partible "private good" w ith ego's allo tm e n t going to h im alone, m ay n o t be th e only w ay (or th e best way) to th in k about th e nonfood benefits accruing to a provider of collective goods in food. O ne likely re su lt of ego's targeting of big game in his foraging is his holding a lo t of other m en around h im to p artake of his largesse in shared m eat. Ego's (and everyone else's) m ajor benefit from th e pres ence of these o th er m en m ay be in com m on defense against wife raiding. C om m on defense is a public good. Strangely, it m ay n o t be tru e th a t this public good per m its freeloading. If m en in th e raided group have no choice b u t to fight together, th en cheating (consuming th e food w ith o u t paying th e "price" of com m on defense) is im possible.
M oving o u t of th e realm of public goods and into the slippery terrain betw een the fully public and the strictly private, an o th er plausible benefit of conspicuous sharing is th e political clo u t to acquire additional wives for ego's sons. W hile th e fitness benefits to ego (in grandchildren) are obvious, th ese benefits can accrue only by virtue of benefits to his sons' m other(s) and to th e sons th e m selves. T hese kinds of in h eren tly fam ilial benefits ap pear (maybe I'm w rong here) to violate the spirit of H aw kes's em phasis on fitness benefits to ego th a t are alternative to th o se realized w ith in th e family.
A nother p o ten tial glitch is th e possibility th a t the biggam e h u n ters are deceived and exploited by the benefi ciaries of th eir efforts. A dm iring glances, easy deference, and coy in sin u atio n s of trysts in th e m oonlight m ay feed those m ore dedicated to acquiring private goods and nourish a big-game h u n te r's ego for years-only to end in a realization in N im ro d 's old age th a t all th a t public adm iration produced little in th e w ay of effective sup port in tough disputes and none of those w hispered flir tations ever culm inated in a biologically significant as signation.
As is h er habit, H aw kes has reform ulated the conven tional w isdom as a testable hypothesis requiring m ore and m ore detailed field data. I look forward to th e round of research kicked off by h er la test questions.
R O Y R I C H A R D G R I N K E R
D epartm ent o f A nthropology, The George W ashington U niversity, W ashington, D.C. 20052, U.S.A. 26 11 93 T his is a w ell-crafted paper w ith a sound and coherent m ethodology. It addresses im p o rtan t questions in th e study of sharing in foraging societies. O ne reason for its coherence is th a t its au th o r is concerned w ith reproduc tive fitness and th u s operates w ith in th e narrow con fines of a cost-benefit explanatory schem e. In so doing, she perpetuates a fu n ctio n alist logic th a t is by now dis m issed by th e m ajority of cultural anthropologists. T h at this paper's theoretical foundations seem anachronistic is ironic, since H aw kes pursues another anachronism in taking hunter-gatherers o u t of th eir proper or historical tim e and treating th em as ethnographic analogies for the distant past. I w ill leave th e problem s of biological perspective to be addressed by others and focus instead on the separation of hunter-gatherers from th e social contexts in w h ich they live.
W hat is especially shocking, although consisten t w ith H aw kes's intentions, is th e dism issal, in just a few sen tences, of " th e special circum stances of th e m odem w orld." O ne of these "special circum stances" is th e rela tionships hunter-gatherers have w ith nonforaging neigh bors. T he groups represented in h er analysis are treated in virtual isolation from th eir contem porary or past so cial relationships and regional histories. T he Lese farm ers and Efe (Pygmy) foragers of Zaire w ith w hom I w ork are an interesting case because th e foragers cannot be understood apart from th e ir relations w ith th e farm ers and because th e sharing of food betw een these groups illustrates som e faults in H aw kes's schem e.
Lese-Efe relations are organized prim arily at th e Lese house. Each house ideally consists of a m an, his wife or wives, th eir children, and an Efe p artner (although th e Efe partner does n o t reside in th e Lese house). Both th e Lese and th e Efe define th eir partnership as a beneficial division of labor in w h ich the Lese p artner shares c u lti vated foods in retu rn for m eat and honey. Partners say th at they give things to get things, but this econom istic m odel conflicts w ith bo th the practice of Lese-Efe rela tionships and th e conceptual schem es and vocabulary Lese and Efe use to represent them .
M y inform ants consistently articulated an econo m istic ideology in w h ich they identified them selves ei ther as foragers (Efe) or farm ers (Lese) and defined LeseEfe relations in term s of th e exchange of m eat and honey for cultivated foods. But, as I have show n (G rinker n.d.), the Lese obtain m o st of th eir m eat by them selves or from other Lese, and th e Efe obtain m any cultivated foods from people o ther th a n th eir partners. Indeed, d u r ing 1985-87, exchanges betw een partners w ere rare. Lese and Efe seldom m en tio n th e variety of activities they share, especially in Lese villages,-am ong other things, the Efe provide labor in the Lese gardens, serve as the m ain participants in m any Lese rituals, and assist in Lese chores. T he relationships th at constitute every day practice are thus dissociated from the ideology of practice; they are conceived as residual to economics. This separation seems at odds w ith a conventional no tion of the gift economy-th at people spend great tim e and effort elaborating kinship, clientship, and other moral relations to m ask their self-interested and eco nom ic behavior. The Lese and the Efe frame their rela tionship, including their identities as farm ers and forag ers, in an idiom of the economy; in other words, the division of labor is an ethnic process, w ith "forager" and "farm er" as ethnic identities. W hat m ay appear to the anthropologist to be a fairly sim ple cost-benefit relation is far m ore complex w hen one considers the conceptual scheme in w hich econom ics are embedded. N either sharing nor interethnic social relations determ ine the other; rather, they are m utually constitutive.
Following Hawkes, one could argue th at the Lese-Efe relationship is functional because, through sharing, the Efe receive social atten tio n from the Lese, th at is, those outside their families. The point I w ant to stress here is th at it is circular reasoning to say th at the Efe give m eat to those outside their fam ilies in order to establish social relations w ith the Lese, because it is the Lese-Efe rela tionship itself th at defines the giving of m eat. Regarding H awkes's concerns w ith fitness, the partnerships do not significantly influence the w ealth or m arriageability of Efe; people w ith or w ith o u t partners m arry and repro duce, and physically and m entally handicapped Efe men, though often bachelors, can and do have partnerships.
Lese and Efe do not believe th at sharing betw een part ners lies outside of the family, and they use the term oki, m eaning the division or distribution of foods w ithin the house, to denote the transfer of foods betw een part ners. As m em bers of the sam e house, partners are "fam ily" and have rights in one another's foods. The Efe do not "exchange" foods any m ore than fathers or m others exchange food w ith their children. In contrast, transfers of food outside the partnership are construed as either oka (purchase) or iregi (exchange). These observations have two im portant im plications. First, w hen we ana lyze sharing we m ust identify the specific social rela tionships involved. Second, com parative studies of shar ing m ust provide culturally specific definitions of the "fam ily." Although H aw kes is concerned w ith family consum ption, it is not clear w hat constitutes the family in the various societies she discusses. The undefined term "fam ily" is juxtaposed to "others," w ith others, I assume, representing those less than a certain fraction of relatedness away from a given ego.
h e n r y h a r p e n d i n g D epartm ent of Anthropology, Pennsylvania State University, U niversity Park, Pa. 16802, U.S.A. 3 
The am ount of tim e m en spend hunting large anim als in foraging societies is an em barrassm ent to cultural ecologists and sociobiologists because it does not m ax im ize energy capture for either the group, the family, or the individual. Hawkes offers several explanations.
The m ost interesting is one th at she does n o t p u rsu eth at there is some critical n u trien t or set of nutrients th at has no t yet been discovered. If there were such a m egam am m al nutrient, then there would be no problem understanding w hy m en h u n t the way they do.
Her other suggestion is th a t "social atten tio n " is the payoff to good hunters. This social attentio n m ust en hance the fitness of the recipient. There are suggestions th at in some groups it m ay be sexual access to females, but we knew paternity am ong the !Kung in the sixties and there was no evidence at all of greater sexual access for good hunters.
H unting large anim als is no t the only puzzling ineffi ciency in hum an subsistence. Farmers who don't pro duce very m uch grain eat the grain, but farmers who produce a lot feed the grain to chickens and then eat eggs (Clark and H asw ell 1966). Why convert ten calories of w heat into one calorie of egg?
We have a deep belief in m ystery nutrien ts th at are found only in certain foods; this is w hy we th in k that we need "balanced diets." Protein was the leading candi date for being the critical m ystery n u trien t for decades, but its prom inence seems to have declined, perhaps in parallel w ith the political im pact of the Am erican dairy industry. All this may, however, reflect an ancient ru n away process. O ur preferences for m eat over n u ts and eggs over porridge m ay m ake little m ore adaptive sense than the lion's m ane or the peacock's tail. I don't know how to test this hypothesis, but w ithout tests we are left w ith just another version of the sequitur th at cul ture m akes us do it. Sociology and Anthropology, Indiana-P urdue U niversity Fort Wayne, Fort Wayne, Ind. 46803-1499, U.S.A. 1 1 11 93 This article is a sound contribution to the growing body of literature th at exam ines optim al behaviors in hum ans from a perspective beyond m erely counting calories. Many have argued against viewing hum ans as Hom o economicus, and indeed, m any m odels th at link hum an behavior to a rational energy-input/energy-yield strategy are poorly validated by em pirical data. Hawkes does a credible job of showing th at n either energy-optim ization nor the m ore sophisticated risk-m inim ization models necessarily explain big-game hunting and m eat sharing among foragers. Since m en reduce short-term family n u tritional intake by hunting and apparently get no de m onstrable long-term caloric reward through reciproc ity, she argues th at they get increased reproductive success through "social attention." At heart, she pro poses th at m ales w ill h u n t and share m eat in order to gain sexual favors from m ultiple wom en, thereby in creasing their reproductive success. Women, in contrast, w ill m axim ize their reproductive success by getting as m uch high-yield nutritional m aterial for them selves and their children as possible through gathering and sharing m eat from m ales w ho h u n t, presum ably m ating w ith m ales w ho provide m eat. M ales w ho m ig h t otherw ise freeload on o th er m en 's h u n tin g are pressured in to h u n t ing in order to keep good h u n ters from co-opting all of th e w om en. It appears th a t m en can either be efficient calorie collectors w ith low social a tte n tio n or inefficient calorie collectors w ith high social attention.
R O B E R T T. JE S K E
D epartm ent of
T his m odel sets up a social econom y w ith several im plications th a t are p otentially testable. First, reproduc tive success in m ales w ho are successful h u n ters/sh arers (hence receive h igh social attention) should be dem on strably higher th a n in m ales w ho are less successful hunters. Second, young m ales in need of social atten tio n should be th e m o st active h u n ters; successful m ales w ho already have access to fem ales, however, should n o t be able to taper off h u n tin g and begin to enjoy the fruits of o th ers' hunting. T here should be a correlation betw een red u ctio n in a m an 's h u n tin g success and re duction in his siring of children. In light of H aw kes's dism issal of delayed-reciprocity m odels, w e should see a tight fit betw een m eat incom e and sexual activity. U n fortunately, she does n o t provide th e data to show th at there is a strong connection betw een h u n tin g success and reproductive success. U n til th ere are good data to support th e connection b etw een th e two, h er m odel pro vides no m ore explanation th a n any of th e others offered to date.
T here are, how ever, additional questions th a t arise from H aw kes's m odel. In order for a m an 's reproductive success to increase as a re su lt of his h u n tin g prowess, w om en m u st have an incentive to have sex w ith suc cessful h u n ters. If all are sharing equally in th e h u n ter's success, th ere is no incentive for a w om an to provide m ore children for th e m eat supplier th a n for the nonsup plier. How, then, does th e h u n te r increase his reproduc tive success, u nless w om en increase th eir reproductive success by offering sex for m eat? W hat is it about m eat, if n o t n u tritio n , th a t m akes it th e chosen m edium for this postulated social exchange?
A further in terestin g question is, If there is an evolu tionary explanation for m ales' h u n tin g big game, th en w hy d o n 't m ore do it? H aw kes's ow n exam ples suggest th a t relatively few m e n atta in th e big-gam e/socialatten tio n payoff. W hy do m any if n o t m ost m en seem to go for th e energy-retum , low -hunting payoff? Is there an age factor involved? W hat o th er factors enhance or degrade th e social a tte n tio n m e n m ay get from hunting? I believe th a t asking th ese kinds of questions and con ducting m ore sophisticated investigations in to aspects of n u tritio n and risk reduction w ill provide us w ith in creasingly b etter insights in to w hy foragers w ork and share.
N I C O L A S P E T E R S O N
D epartm ent o f A rchaeology and Anthropology, The
A ustralian N a tio n a l U niversity, Canberra, A.C .T. 26 0 1, A ustralia. 3 1 1x1 93 T he problem w ith m u ch of th e w riting by evolutionary ecologists is n o t th a t it is w rong b u t th a t it is sociologi cally im poverished. W orking w ith a series of sim ple con trasts betw een individual and society, biology and cu l ture, and selfishness and altru ism provides for great clarity in th e definition of problem s and th e ir analysis b u t does n o t do justice to th e com plexity of social reality and frequently leads to banal conclusions. T h u s th is pa per concludes th at, "Paradoxically, th is very 'm aterial is t' evolutionary econom ics anticipates th e problem th a t n o t all incentives are 'm a te ria l.'" W ho ever th o u g h t they were?
H aw kes invokes th e selfishness-altruism dichotom y to ask w hy foragers ever target resources th a t w ill go m ostly to others rath er th a n to th eir spouses and ch il dren. A com m only heard justification for polarising problem s in th is w ay is th a t it leads to testable h y p o th e ses. T he first th a t H aw kes considers is th a t sharing is a m eans of risk reduction. T h is is set aside, however, be cause it "lacks em pirical support." T h e im plicatio n th a t sharing does n o t reduce risk in som e situatio n s seem s unlikely. W hat is w rong here is th e idea th a t sharing is only a m eans of risk reduction. Sharing is a com plex behaviour w h ich cannot be reduced to a single conse quence or significance.
The second hypothesis is th a t " th e incentive for pro viding w idely shared goods is favorable a tte n tio n from other group m em bers," w h ich gives th e m ale sharers a m ating advantage. O n th e basis of A ustralian ethnogra phy (w hich has to be encom passed by th e generalisation if it is valid) it can be said th a t h u n ters do receive a tte n tion (even if it is often m arked negatively by th eir being deliberately ignored) in th a t they confirm th eir poten tial as good sons-in-law by providing m eat to th eir future w ives' parents; they enhance th eir access to religious know ledge by gifts to th e older m en of th eir descent group; they enhance th eir statu s m ore generally; and, in long-delayed reciprocity, they n u rtu re those w ho n u r tured th e m w hen th ey w ere young. Providing m eat to in-law s is som ething all young m en have to do in order to secure a bride. T hus th ere is no doubt th a t supplying m eat is related to m ating-b u t th is is m ating by all m en, and it is n o t th e sole or even th e m o st im p o rtan t deter m in an t of how m any w ives a m an m ay have or how m any children.
T he th ird hypothesis is th a t sharing takes place as tolerated th eft in situ atio n s in w h ich th e cost of de fending a resource is greater th a n th e benefits to be had by doing so. T he evidence adduced for tolerated th eft is so-called dem and sharing. But to construe dem and shar ing as tolerated th eft (that is, taking w ith o u t rig h t or obligation) is to m isunderstand th e n atu re of in terper sonal sociality in egalitarian societies. D em and sharing is testing, asserting, and sub stan tiatin g behaviour, n o t evidence for large gam e's being a public good.
The conclusion to be draw n from th e foregoing is w ell stated by H aw kes: "T h e m odels are . . . too sim ple to capture w h a t actually goes on in foraging co m m u n i ties." For social anthropologists part of th e problem is th a t m u ch of th e dialogue of th e evolutionary ecologists is in an evolutionary tim e fram e, w h ich m eans th at som e of th e com plexities of present-day social behaviour m ay be noise even w h en they are v ital to social life and social reproduction. More concern w ith the present would help break down the binary contrasts th at vitiate so m uch of th eir work. It m ight also lead them to pro vide m ore relevant data. D espite the em phasis on the conferral of a m ating advantage, we have no dem o graphic inform ation at all. By now the effective hunters that Richard Lee was w riting about in the sixties m ust have grandchildren: have they been propagating their genes m ore effectively than the rest? Doubtless nothing statistically significant could be said from w hat is likely to be a sm all sample, but asking the question m ight well prom pt m ore social analysis. Washington, Seattle, Wash. 9819s, U.S.A. 15 111 93 This article offers a critique of the received wisdom con cerning hunter-gatherer food sharing and proposes an al ternative explanation for same. The critique seems to m e fairly effective, if not definitive, but I do not find the alternative com pelling or even comprehensible.
E R IC A L D E N S M IT H
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The critique has tw o elem ents, one theoretical and the other empirical. The theoretical point is th at a col lective benefit from food sharing such as risk (variance) reduction does not m ean th at rational choice or natural selection will favor its provision by self-interested indi viduals. This point has been recognized for some tim e by anthropologists w ith an evolutionary-ecology orien tation (Kaplan and H ill 198512, Blurton Jones 1984) and modeled explicitly as a "prisoner's dilem m a" (Smith 1988, Sm ith and Boyd 1990) . This article articulates this point for a broader anthropological audience. But w hat is unstable in a one-shot prisoner's-dilem m a game is not necessarily so in a repeated one (Taylor 1987) , and an ongoing pattern of food sharing is certainly no t a oneshot interaction (Smith 1988) . The em pirical critique consists of dem onstrating th at for the few cases where we have the requisite data, contributions to collective goods (shared game] are no t balanced: some hunters con sistently bring in the lioness's share of the harvest, and poorer hunters gain by sharing in such largesse. Further more, those who contribute little to the collective har vest by voluntary failure to try hard are (allegedly) not therefore excluded from their share. But I read the ethno graphic data from a num ber of other cases (such as Inuit) to contradict the notion th at slackers will not face any sanctions or loss of collective benefits, and three ethno graphic cases are not a particularly robust basis on which to rest the case against the risk-reduction expla nation. Hence m y conclusion th at this critique of the conventional wisdom is to be taken seriously but not accepted as definitive.
Turning to the proposed alternative, I w ill grant that the m athem atical derivation of results is done correctly and w ith exemplary clarity, but I question the logical connection between this particular m odel (table 2 ) and the real (or even ideal-type) world. The form ulation be gins w ith "social atten tio n " as a sim ple function of prox im ity: individuals pay attention to good hunters because doing so w ill bring them a larger share of the catch sim ply by their being nearby when it is brought in. This in turn is assum ed to benefit the providers, because "pref erences in association" w ill have fitness benefits in any social anim al. There is no tem ptation to underprovide attention (to "free-ride"), because there is a direct link between proxim ity, attention, and getting better shares.
If I have represented the argum ent correctly, here are m y objections: First, I do n o t read the ethnographic liter ature as indicating th at proxim ity is usually required for receipt of a share. Sharing is often ritualized, as in the seal-sharing partnerships of m any Inuit (van de Velde 1956) , or in any case does not necessarily appear to favor those who hang around the provider. Second, proxim ity or other forms of "social atten tio n " can be costly to the recipients, exposing them to "tolerated theft" (Blurton Jones 1984) . If proxim ity is the key to getting a bigger share, good foragers m ay find their m ovem ents, their very foraging success im peded by followers eager to par take of their catch. Hawkes m ay reply that it is not prox im ity th at is im plicated in "social atten tio n " but such particulars as "deference in decisions about travel, sup port in disputes . . . and enhanced m ating opportuni ties." Fine, but then we are in a situation of delayed reciprocity. This raises all the issues of collective action, sanctioning, free-riding, and so on, posed in the original risk-reduction form ulation of the conventional wisdom. Instantiated as exchange of food for social goods (mating, deference, support), the proposed solution solves the col lective action problem of risk reduction sim ply by defer ring it to the second-order collective action problem of social exchange.
In sum, I do no t see how the magic of "social atten tion" solves the sharing conundrum . Either the atten tion is too diffuse and problem atic to m otivate share givers or it is a collective good th at will not m otivate share takers (at least not any m ore effectively than the collective good of sharing-as-risk-reduction). I consider the received view of sharing challenged but not defeated and certainly not replaced by a stronger contender. Que., Canada H3A 2K 6. 17 111 93 This paper represents a substantial contribution to the long-running discussion in anthropology concerning hunter-gatherer strategies of resource exploitation and resource sharing. Indeed, H aw kes's central questionWhy do hunter-gatherers work?-can be so interpreted as to provide an im portant lead into the m uch larger question of the social dynamic(s) and m eaning of subsis tence as a culturally organized set of activities.
More specifically, however, this article has two ele m ents th at are of im m ediate interest. The first is that it explicitly links the choices hunters m ake about the kind of prey they exploit to decisions regarding resource allocation w ith in the larger population of w hich they are h a w k e s Why Huntei-Gatheieis Work | 3 5 7 a part. W hile it has been som e tim e since th e behavioral dim ension of w h a t h u n ters do has been lim ited to the actual capture of prey (see Laughlin 1968, A ltm an 19 87), it is still rath er infrequent for researchers to explore the direct connection betw een these tw o decision sets.
Second, H awkes, w hile w orking squarely w ith in the fram ew ork of socioecology, successfully expands the overall perspective in w hich resource sharing is gener ally cast by proponents of optim al foraging theory. In general, o p tim al foragers have tak en th e view th at (1 j im m ediate sharing provides a h u n te r w ith insurance against a fu tu re tim e w hen less success m ay be enjoyed (variance reduction) and (a) sharing reduces th e un cer tain ty in h eren t in th e p u rsu it of scarce big game. H aw kes leans strongly tow ard a third, less frequently articulated view, nam ely, th a t sharing represents a form of tolerated th eft through w hich harvest resources are projected from th e realm of private into th a t of public goods as individuals eschew short-term consum ption re tu rn s so th a t th ey m ay accum ulate social capital and, u ltim ately, reproductive advantage.
This, however, appears to m e n o t to represent the w hole explanation for w hy h u n ters share and how re sources becom e public. A critical elem ent of wildlife harvesting is th a t it is an activity n o t easily carried out w ith great success by lone producers. Rather, m ost forms of large-game procurem ent require th e coordi nated action of several individuals. Thus, harvesting be gins, in term s of th e tim e and energy in v estm en t re quired, as a shared activity com plex. Am ong In u it of the Eastern C anadian Arctic, th e h u n tin g of m ost form s of interesting gam e alm ost alw ays involves th e coordi nated action of from tw o to five or six harvesters. It w ould appear from ethnological evidence th a t there is an aspect to n o rth ern food sharing th a t recognizes the su bstantial energy and tim e contributions of all partici pants of a h u n t group to th e success enjoyed by one or tw o m em bers. In w in ter sea-ice sealing, for instance, each h u n ter m akes a contribution to group success by, at th e very least, denying th e use of a breathing hole to seals (N elson 1969, W enzel 19 9 1), th u s aiding in the capture of a seal by an associated h u n te r w aiting at an other station. T h e fact th a t h u n ters A, B, and C do not capture seals w hile X and Z succeed does n o t negate the form er's co n trib u tion to overall group success. In other words, th ere is no transform ation of "goods" from pri vate to public because harvesting is prem ised on col lectiv e/ cooperative action. Indeed, virtually all form s of In u it p u rsu it of large anim als begin w ith an acknow ledg m en t of th e w ide social contextualization of harvesting, and th is co n tex tu alization or em beddedness has broad im plications for th e substance of subsistence relations. Science Foundation, 1800 G St. N .W ., W ashington, D.C. 20550, U.S.A. 5 111 93 In a study of faunal rem ains from abandoned IKung San cam ps (Yellen 1986) I analyzed change in m eat diet over a 32-year period w h ich covered th e tran sitio n from h u n t ing and gathering to a m ixed strategy incorporating cat tle and goats as w ell as w ild game. T he data indicated th a t cattle, in essence, directly replaced large ungulates and th a t goats likew ise cam e to fill th e sam e n ich e and assum e th e sam e relative im portance as h u n ted anim als of about th e sam e size. A t th e tim e I found it difficult to understand w hy replacem ent rather th a n addition took place, since young boys herd livestock and adult h u n ters still had th e tim e to m ain tain traditional pursuits. W hy n o t use th is opportunity to add to th e am o u n t of m eat obtained? I concluded th a t th is p attern w as best u n d er stood n o t in im m ediate subsistence term s and adopted the suggestion by A lison Brooks th a t "h u n te rs in th e successful p u rsu it of large anim als benefit m ore from the long-term reinforcem ent of social ties th a n sh o rt term n u tritio n a l re tu rn s" (p. 774). D ata such as these support th e general approach w h ich H aw kes adopts and suggest th a t it should be exam ined and developed in a system atic way. T he strength of H aw kes's paper lies in her presentation of a form al m odel w h ich attem p ts to interpret subsistence activities w ith in a broader social and evolutionary context. T he im plications for th e u n derstanding of sexual division of labor are also sig nificant.
H aw kes clearly recognizes how com plex th e world can be, and several IKung San exam ples serve to illu s trate this. In m o st instances it is a poisoned arrow fired by a single individual w h ich results in an an im al's death, and therefore it is th a t m an, in H aw kes's term s, w ho qualifies as the "successful h u n te r." However, th is obscures th e ex ten t to w h ich large-game h u n tin g is a com m unal effort. In th e Kalahari, for exam ple, large an i m als are highly m obile and h ard to locate. T he inform a tion about gam e m ovem ent derived from anim al tracks observed by unsuccessful h u n ters and by w om an g ather ers and th e n shared across th e group can set th e stage for the one successful individual on th e follow ing day. H aw kes's m odel, as I understand it, assum es th a t th e h u n te r can rightly claim th a t success derives 10 0 % from his ow n efforts, and one can question how often in real ity it holds.
A second issue involves delayed reciprocity. H ow does one know th a t a h u n te r does n o t give m eat away today w ith th e expectation th a t it w ill be returned at som e future date w h en th e ethnographer is no longer there to record it? H aw kes is clearly aw are of th is problem and uses both data-oriented and theoretical approaches to deal w ith it. T here is one caution, however, w hich m ight be noted: H u n tin g ability varies over th e course of an individual lifetim e, increasing w ith experience and th en tailing off as physical stren g th and eyesight decline. !Kung know , for exam ple, th a t old m en are n o t good hunters, and one m ig h t w onder if younger m en are n o t in effect banking against old age. In such a hypothetical case, reciprocity is long delayed, and th e question is dif ficult to exam ine directly.
H aw kes presents th e hunter-gatherer w orld in term s of a dichotom y: th ere is food and th e n u tritio n it pro vides, and th e n there is essentially everything else, lum ped together as "social atten tio n ." This strikes m e as an appropriate first step, since models, by definition, simplify reality and sim ple form ulations precede more complex ones. W hat happens, however, if one recognizes that among the !Kung good trance dancers are rare and that the m edicine th at passes from their hands is also a good which can be conceptualized in the same way as m eat from a large game animal? I w ould ask-as a ques tion, rather than a criticism -w hat happens to a "pub lic-goods approach" w hen a num ber of public goods and m ultiple actors w ith differential control over them m ay be involved. Is the entire approach undermined, or can refinem ents deal w ith the issue?
Finally, it is w orth considering the hunting/socialattention model in a broader ecological context as Hawkes agrees one should. Where m eat is hard to come by, the m odel m ight apply, but w hat happens as this resource becomes successively easier to obtain? Does this approach fall apart, or do other public goods (or com binations of them ) com e to the fore? It m ight be interest ing to see w hat w ould happen if one attem pted to apply this basic view of hum an behavior to a pastoralist group.
Reply
K R IS T E N H A W K E S
Salt Lake City, Utah, U . SA . 26 iv 93 Grinker m akes the m ost general objections to m y argu m ent: (1 ) th at it uses functionalist logic, (2) th at it treats contem porary hunter-gatherers as analogs for the distant past, and (3) that it isolates groups from their regional tem poral and social contexts. These are im portant be cause they m ark a boundary of understanding between theoretical orientations. (Can those from one under stand "th e other"?) Behavioral ecologists try to explain why organisms do one thing rather than another by ex amining the fitness-related costs and benefits of feasi ble alternatives. Features of interest are explained in term s of their adaptive "function," th at is, their effects on the survival and reproduction (more generally, inclu sive fitness) of the individuals displaying them because natural selection designs features by way of these ef fects. In social and cultural anthropology "functional ism " (pace M alinowski) sought to explain social pat terns by their effects on the survival or reproduction of a m etaphorical superorganism. Various devastating problems w ith group-level functionalism have been rec ognized not only by evolutionary biologists, critical of the explanation of patterns by their effects on group or species survival (e.g., W illiam s 1966), but also by social scientists (e.g., Elster 1989), w ho nevertheless seek to explain social outcom es as the result of individuals' m aking "functional" choices, th at is, preferring alterna tives that better serve their ow n goals.
As to the use of m odem foragers as analogs for the distant past, it is a central evolutionary proposition th at contem porary organisms have been designed by their evolutionary history: we are the richest source of evi dence about our evolutionary past. A t the same time, every m om ent, every event differs from every other and is itself as m ultiple as its participants. Probably neither of these propositions is actually in dispute. The question is how we proceed in light of them . Patterns (let alone their recognition) are possible only if some of the vari ables and some of the values they take m ake m ore differ ence than others. W hat we disagree about is w hich vari ables are likely to m ake the m ost difference. On the basis of his Efe experience, G rinker suspects th at rela tionships w ith neighboring ethnic groups play a more im portant role in resource choice and patterns of sharing in the ethnographic cases I cite than characteristics of the available wild food resources. T hat is an empirical question. The descriptive records of !Kung-speakers in the Dobe area in the sixties, of the Ache around Chupa Pou in the early eighties, and of the Hadza in T li'ika from the m ideighties to the present show th at local re source characteristics have system ic effects on foraging strategies. This is no t a general argum ent against the im portance of other variables. If complex social arrange m ents can be explained as the outcom e of individuals' m utually adjusting their own behavior according to their available options, then the character and value of those options continually m atter. Changing dangers of attack from enemies, changing alternatives to trade with, m ate w ith, or work for neighbors m ight have im portant effects on the choices people m ake. Posing and testing contrary hypotheses about these effects could be illum inating (see, e.g., Blurton Jones, Hawkes, and O 'C onnell n.d.).
Grinker and especially Peterson are critical of the readiness w ith w hich evolutionary ecologists focus on a sm all num ber of ecological and behavioral dim ensions at a tim e. Again, this focus does not arise from an as sum ption th at only these variables m atter. Instead, the proposition is th at som ething can be learned from how they m atter in the case at hand th at adds to our under standing of how they m atter generally. Variables ex pected to be im portant on theoretical grounds and m ea surable across cases are m ore attractive candidates for study. I am ripping subjects out of their regional con texts. W hether or no t th at is useful turns on the ques tions of interest and on the em pirical patterns showing how the variables under study are related.
The strong appeal of variance-reduction explanations for sharing is im pressive. I reiterate the central (and par adoxically no t so contentious) point th at no m atter how great the "group benefits," they are rarely enough for self-interested actors to provide a collective good. Harpending rates it an em barrassm ent to sociobiology th at hunting does not m axim ize energy acquisition for "the group, the family, or the individual," but sociobiologists should expect conflicts of interest w ithin groups, w ith "inefficiencies" a com m on result. Sm ith notes that m any have shown how iterated games produce different solutions than one-shot prisoner's dilem m as. True, but stim ulated by Axelrod's influential argum ent to th e con trary, they have also shown th at an evolutionarily stable pattern of reciprocity is no t often one of them . The m odel S m ith cites (Sm ith and Boyd 1990) is an illu stra tion. H e explored th e circum stances in w hich neigh boring groups m ay do b etter to allow access to each o ther's foraging territory. According to th e m odel, they do b etter to allow th e use of th eir territory only w hen the costs of defending it outw eigh the benefits of keep ing others out. T h e relatively im m ediate costs of not sharing (tolerated th eft instead of reciprocity) determ ine w h eth er allow ing access is th e d om inant strategy.
As Beckerm an says, " th e literatu re bursts w ith ac counts of th e w eight of reciprocity in egalitarian societ ies." T he label is ubiquitous, b u t it is used in ethnology for p attern s in w h ich quid pro quo is explicitly denied and th e obligations of th e social relationship are said to govern instead. I cited th e classic ethnological review (Sahlins 19 65; 19 7 2 : chap. 5) enum erating exam ples in w hich transfers are n o t literally reciprocal and m ore re cent argum ents con sistent w ith th is (Ingold, Riches, and W oodburn 1988, Bird-David 1990) . P eterson's com m ent th at in A ustralia one of th e reasons young m en h u n t is to pay back th e old m en w ho n u rtu red th em in "longdelayed reciprocity" is an exam ple of com m on usage. This pattern does n o t involve repeated exchanges w ith each p arty 's cu rren t costs com pensated by delayed bene fits returned. A n old m an cannot w ithhold his previous n u rtu rin g "n ex t tim e " if a young m an does n o t give. As Peterson notes, young m en m ay have o th er things to gain from old m en, b u t th a t is a different argum ent. N otions of debt and repaym ent shape m an y of m y own actions and seem to shape those of others I observe both in th e "field" and out. Surely reciprocity m u st fit som e of it, b u t there is a great deal th a t it does n o t fit. The delays are too long, the flows too consistently one-way, th e p u n ish m en t for cheaters too m ild or absent alto gether. If som ething besides k in effects and reciprocity m akes a big difference in pattern s of social behavior in sm all-scale co m m u nities dependent on w ild food, the sam e thing m ay, as Y ellen says, be im p o rtan t in other social settings.
I picked th e th ree cases because of biases in m y ow n experience b u t m ig h t easily have added th e G unw inngu because of A ltm an 's rich ethnography. H is case descrip tions and q u an titativ e data (A ltm an 1987, A ltm an and Peterson 1988) show (1 ) th e w ider sharing of larger, m ore unpredictably acquired resources, (2 ) th e im portance of current in eq u ities over re tu rn s for past favors in th e dis trib u tio n of shares, and (3 ) persistent biases in the con trib u tio n of these w idely shared resources. M y argum ent is th a t th e first tw o p atterns m ake large, unpredictably acquired resources like public goods and th a t th e third p attern im plies th a t som ething o th er th an shares re turned (and so reduced variance in th eir ow n consum p tion) m u st m o tiv ate suppliers. A ltm an and Peterson both note th a t sharing does reduce risk, so I repeat th at m y argum ent is n o t th a t sharing fails to reduce con su m p tio n variance b u t th a t such an outcom e is insuffi cien t to explain w hy people do it. People fail to supply all kinds of collective goods. Yet in each of these cases m en spend su b stan tial am o u n ts of tim e trying to acquire resources w h ich w ill be consum ed by others.
M y p resen tatio n has led Jeske to surm ise incorrectly th at only a few m en h u n t. A m ong th e A che and !Kung (Hawkes et al. 19 85) m ore successful h u n ters spend m ore tim e h u n tin g (we have n o t yet done the analysis for th e Hadza), b u t m en w ho are less successful spend tim e h u n tin g as w ell. Y ellen's observation about th e com plexities of assigning credit w hen m any are in volved and W enzel's p oint about cooperative sealing should be underlined, b u t big-game h u n tin g is often n o t cooperative (Yellen 19 7 7 : appendix B; Lee 19 79 : chap. 8). Hadza m en usu ally h u n t alone. As Jeske says, m ore data are needed. I agree w ith Pe terson th a t data on th e reproductive success of !Kung h u n ters w ould be of great interest. P ublication of the records H arpending m en tio n s w ould be m o st welcom e. A variety of questions could, however, be asked. In som e discussions of evolutionary approaches, th e use of vari ables o th er th a n an actual co u n t of descendants in a future generation is described as an unfo rtu n ate neces sity. Proxy variables for fitness are seen as poor b u t inev itable su b stitu tes because " th e real th in g " cannot a c tu ally be m easured in th e present. But m o st of the tim e it is th e current trade-offs th a t are of central interest. If m ore successful h u n ters do have m ore grandchildren, th at w ill n o t tell us h o w successful h u n tin g and n u m bers of grandchildren are linked. If they do n o t have grandchildren, th e n sam ple size (and so o ther character istics of those particular m en or th a t particular tim e slice), o th er unm easured fitness com ponents (such as sisters' grandchildren), or m ixed strategies (in w hich, for example, poor big-game h u n ters spend m ore tim e ac quiring private goods and so gain com parable fitness pay offs) could all be im plicated. T he assum ption th a t in d i viduals have been designed by th eir evolutionary h istory to act in th eir ow n fitness in tere st is a pow erful one. G iven it, the question is n o t w h eth er b u t h o w individu als can be serving th eir probable fitness b etter by doing w hat they do ra th e r th a n things th ey could do instead. M odeling can clarify requirem ents im p licit in our favor ite guesses and also specify hypotheses about th e con straints and trade-offs th a t w e need to find w ays to test.
